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LOUIS v. BARENFANGER: SCAFFOLD ACT EXTENDED
TO INCLUDE A PERMANENT STEEL BEAM
Plaintiff Louis fell from a series of metal beams upon which
he had been working during the construction of a school building
and was injured. The beams were a permanent and integral part
of the new building, and did not have plank scaffolding laid over
them upon which plaintiff could walk. He brought suit against
the general contractor, Barenfanger, under the Illinois Scaffold
Act,' alleging that defendant permitted plaintiff to use these beams
for support knowing that their component parts were spaced too
far apart and were of insufficient width to give plaintiff proper
footing and protection. Plaintiff contended that the beams were
consequently not safe within the meaning of the Scaffold Act.
Plaintiff also alleged violation of the Act by the fact that de-
fendant had not placed plank scaffolding on the beams to support
plaintiff.
A scaffold act sets forth mandatory standards of safety for
scaffolding used in building construction, and it imposes liability
upon a construction employer for injuries sustained by workmen
as a result of an unsafe scaffold. The acts were passed to further
protect employees who were not sufficiently covered because of
limitations in the common law safe place rule. The court in
Louis v. Barenfanger2 held that the Scaffold Act imposed lia-
bility on the employer when an employee fell not from a scaf-
fold but from permanent steel beams. It also held that the em-
ployer was liable under the Act for not placing a scaffold over
those beams. These holdings appear to be contrary to the weight
of authority. This Note will examine the approach of the courts,
1. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1957). Section 60 reads:
That all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other
mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any per-
son, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection,
repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building,
bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and con-
structed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate pro-
tection to the life and limb of any person, or persons employed
or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in
such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may
be used or deposited thereon.
Section 69 reads in part:
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful
violations of this act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its
provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for
any direct damages sustained thereby ....
2. 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724 (1968).
both at common law and under the scaffold acts, when dealing with
the question of an employer's duty to his employees engaged in
construction, in order to determine the soundness of the Louis
decision.
THE COMMON LAW SAFE-PLACE RULE
In the absence of a statutory duty, common law requires an
employer either to use reasonable care to provide a safe place to
work and safe appliances for his employees, or to warn his em-
ployees of latent dangers of which they could not reasonably be
aware., These requirements have generally been designated as
the safe-place rule. An employer is liable to an injured employee
only if it can be shown that he has breached the duty that this
rule imposes upon him.4 However, the employer is not required
to "stand by during the progress of the work to see when a danger
arises. It is sufficient if he provides against such dangers as
may possibly arise, and gives the workmen the means of pro-
tecting themselves."5
If the working conditions are reasonably safe, and there are
no latent dangers, the duty of providing a safe-place is fulfilled.
The risk of injury that is incident to the nature of the work
itself is assumed by the employee. 6 Thus, a balance is created
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or AGENCY § 492 (1958):
A master is subject to a duty that care be used either to provide
working conditions which are reasonably safe for his servants and
subservants, considering the nature of the employment, or to warn
them of risks of unsafe conditions which he should realize they
may not discover by the exercise of due care.
For other statements of the rule, see Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, 138 Ind.
496, 38 N.E. 62 (1894) (employee killed in quarry); Pennsylvania Co. v.
Whitcomb, 111 Ind. 212, 12 N.E. 380 (1887) (brakeman killed while coup-
ling railroad cars); Dayharsh v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co., 103 Mo. 570, 15
S.W. 554 (1891) (plaintiff hit by engine while shoveling ashes from a
roundhouse); Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162, 33 A. 1102 (1895)
(workman killed in excavation cave-in).
4. See Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162, 33 A. 1102 (1895).
5. Id. at 1103. At 1104 the court states: "But the employer is not an
insurer. In such a case he is only bound to reasonable care. He is not to
provide against danger that an ordinarily prudent man would not antici-
pate." See Brown v. People's Gaslight Co., 81 Vt. 477, 71 A. 204, 206 (1908)
(workman injured in cave-in of a ditch). "But it seems to us that the
master has fully complied with the safe place rule when he has provided
against such dangers as may reasonably be apprehended by furnishing the
servant with the means of protecting himself."
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 499 (1958): "A master
who has performed his duties of care is not liable to a servant harmed by
a risk incident to the nature of the work." See Anderson v. Smith, 35
App. D.C. 93 (1910) (decedent killed when heavy door fell on him during
demolition work); Lee v. Pate, 198 Ark. 123, 131 S.W.2d 8 (1939) (workman
tripped over rod on ground); Brown v. People's Gaslight Co., 81 Vt. 477,
71 A. 204 (1908) (workman injured in cave-in of a ditch). See also Big
Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, 138 Ind. 496, 38 N.E. 52 (1894) (quarry employee
killed; "Where the danger is equally known or open to both the master and
the servant, there is no liability on the part of the master."); Weber v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 20 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1929) (deceased fell
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between an employer's duty and an employee's assumption of
risk. Once the employer has reasonably provided for a safe work-
ing place, the employees "should look out for ... dangers and
use the means provided"7 for their protection.
One way an employer can breach his safe-place duty is by
failing to supply a scaffold from which the employee can work,
provided the employer can foresee a danger to the employee
working without it." In Smith v. Rich9 the employer had in-
structed a workman not to build a scaffold under a window,
while attaching storm sheathing, but to work instead from the
window ledge, eight feet above the ground. To work from this
position the employee had to hold onto the window with one
hand and nail with the other. The employee lost an eye when
a nail glanced from the work and struck him. The court rea-
soned that in this situation the employer should have known a
risk of injury existed. Under the circumstances, by failing to
provide a scaffold, he had not provided a safe place for his em-
ployee to work. The rationale is that by failing to provide a
scaffold, the employer did not take the due regard for his em-
ployee's safety that a prudent employer in similar circumstances
would take. Presumably, in the Smith case, if a scaffold had
been provided, the employer's reasonable duty would have been
fulfilled. If a nail had then glanced and injured the workman,
no liability would have attached to the employer.
Failure to supply a scaffold on high construction beams would
not be a breach of the safe-place rule, however, for there is an
exception made to the rule in construction or demolition work,
where the conditions of the work are constantly changing.10 Thus
from unsafe scaffold: assumption of risk stated, but defendant did not
sustain burden of proof); Jakopac v. Newport Mining Co., 153 Wis. 176, 140
N.W. 1060 (1913) (plaintiff injured in mine cave-in; rule stated, but plain-
tiff did not assume risk of a non-obvious danger).
7. Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162, 33 A. 1102, 1103 (1895).
8. Smith v. Rich, 196 N.C. 72, 144 S.W. 537 (1928); Deckert v. Chi-
cago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 483, 124 N.E.2d 372 (1955)
(workman fell from pipes he was cutting and on which he had to lie to
work; the court states that under common-law rules an employer could be
held liable for his failure to furnish "an instrumentality such as a scaffold,
where the employer ought to have anticipated that the calamity would re-
sult from the employee's working without the appliance").
9. 196 N.C. 72, 144 S.W. 537 (1928).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 493, comment d. (1958)
(the degree of safety varies with the progress of the work; during initial
construction the premises may necessarily be more dangerous). American
Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 F. 605 (8th Cir. 1906) (workman knocked from
bridge construction by load of materials); Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky
v. Watson, 154 Ky. 550, 157 S.W. 929 (1913) (plaintiff injured when beam
the employer does not have to place scaffolding on the building
to keep his employees safe at every moment. The dangers of
building construction, absent negligence on the employer's part
or latent dangers of which the employer has knowledge, are con-
sidered the ordinary dangers incident to the work, and are there-
fore assumed by the employee." The courts recognize that in a
construction situation the employees themselves are creating and
changing the working conditions, and that it is seemingly impos-
sible for an employer to adhere to the safe-place rule at every
moment of the construction. 12 Therefore, the duty of reasonable
care is shifted onto the employee for his own safety. 8
When the employer does supply a scaffold for the workman's
use, the rule provides that it must be safe. But just because an
employee works upon the beams of a building does not make those
beams a scaffold. The courts refuse to apply the safe-place rule
to the beams of a building by distinguishing the primary purpose
of the place from which an employee falls or is otherwise injured
from the incidental purpose.14 If an employee falls from a per-
broke during demolition); Holloran v. Union Iron & Foundry Co., 133 Mo.
470, 35 S.W. 260 (1896) (workman fell from girder); McNeill v. Bottsford-
Dickinson Co., 128 App. Div. 544, 112 N.Y.S. 867 (1908) (deceased fell from
steel beams); Lewinn v. Murphy, 63 Wash. 356, 115 P. 740 (1911) (deceased
killed when hit by timber falling from floors above); Armour v. Hahn, 111
U.S. 313, 318 (10th Cir. 1884) (workman fell from beams). The court
said:
The obligation of a master to provide reasonably safe places and
structures for his servants to work upon does not impose upon
him the duty, as towards them, of keeping a building, which they
are employed in erecting, in a safe condition at every moment of
their work, so far as its safety depends upon the due performance
of that work by them and their fellows.
11. Decatur v. Chas. H. Tompkins Co., 25 F.2d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1928)
(plaintiff stepped on a nail at construction site); Anderson v. Smith, 35 App.
D.C. 93 (1910) (decedant killed when heavy door fell on him during demo-
lition); Beique v. Hosmer, 169 Mass. 541, 48 N.E. 338 (1897) (plaintiff fell
through hole in floor of building being constructed); Richardson v. Anglo-
American Provision Co., 72 Ill. App. 77, 80 (1897) (plaintiff fell from un-
nailed board on roof): "The hazard involved in working upon a building
during such changes of condition should, it would seem, be held to be an
ordinary hazard, incident to the employment and hence assumed by the
employee."
12. See Armour v. Hahn, 111 U.S. 313 (10th Cir. 1884), note 10 supra.
13. Kuptz v. Ralph Solliett & Sons Constr. Co., 88 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1937) There a workman fell from concrete form on beams of building. The
court said:
Every workman understands that there is more or less danger in-
cident to the erection of a building, and that conditions of safety
will change from time to time as the work progresses. He knows
... that he must exercise reasonable care to discover and avoid
dangers incident to the work; excluding, of course, extraneous
or concealed dangers ....
14. This determination is explained in Stourbridge v. Brooklyn City
R. Co., 9 App. Div. 129, 41 N.Y.S. 128, 130 (1896). A workman was working
on a wooden cross beam when the beam broke; he fell and sustained in-
juries from which he later died. The defendant was not held liable for the
death, and the court explained:
[D]oubtless, in one sense of the term, the employee must always
Notes
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manent beam of a building during the course of construction,
the safe-place rule is not applied because the beam is not pro-
vided as a place for the employee to work. Instead it is pro-
vided primarily to become a part of the work itself. The work-
man's use of the beam for support is merely incidental to this
primary purpose. Since the beam is a part of the work, and
dangers incident to the work are assumed by an employee, the
employee thus assumes the danger of a fall from that beam.
It appears that the distinction between the primary and in-
cidental purpose of the beam is made, and the safe-place rule
not applied, as a matter of policy. This is shown by courts
indicating that if an employer were held liable, without breach
of duty on his part, for an injury incurred by a workman in the
process of construction, the employer would be hesitant to under-
take such construction.15
THE SCAFFOLD ACTS
In response to the court's refusal to apply the safe-place rule
to construction, resulting in immunity to liability for construction
employers, and because of the peculiar dangers associated with
working on high construction, many states were led to adopt so-
called scaffold acts.16 Such acts impose criminal penalties and
be in some place; and doubtless, also, the place, in a certain
sense, is not safe if an accident occurs there. But the rule that
the master must provide a safe place to work only applies where
the work and the place are not connected,-where the work is not
the construction of the place, as in the case of a mill, factory,
mine . . . etc. In the present case the cross beam was not fur-
nished for the purpose of providing the plaintiff a place to work,
but as a part of the structure which he and the other workmen
were engaged in erecting. . . If there was a latent danger of
which it [defendant] had knowledge, it should have apprised the
workmen. But the distinction I seek to impress is that here the
beam was part of the structure,-the common work upon which
all the employees were employed,-and the use of it by the de-
ceased for support the mere incident.
15. Holloran v. Union Iron & Steel Foundry Co., 133 Mo. 470, 478,
35 S.W. 260, 262 (1896). Workman fell from the beams of a building; the
court found that the beams from which he fell were "entirely sound." It
continues by saying:
In the course of the erection of a new building, it is almost im-
possible to keep it in an absolutely safe condition at every moment
of the work. . . . Certain risks are ordinarily incident to the state
of things found in the unfinished condition of every building in
course of construction. . . . The master has never been held for
such injuries to his servants. If he were, he would be the in-
surer . . . of his servant's or employee's safety. No one would
dare to undertake a work requiring the employment of mechanics
and laborers to assist him, if such a rule should prevail.
16. Those states having statutes specifically relating to scaffolds are:
civil liability upon those employers who erect unsafe scaffolding.
They also impose mandatory scaffolding requirements for the
building itself. The purpose of these acts is to protect construc-
tion workers, so that negligence on their part in doing their work
might not prove fatal.17 The common-law defenses of assumption
of risk and contributory negligence are foreclosed. 8 Typically,
scaffold acts deal with all aspects of scaffolds. They apply to
scaffolds used in the "erection, repairing, alteration, removal or
painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct or other struc-
ture.""' Common provisions of an act are: (1) that an employer
shall not erect a scaffold that is unsafe or improper in relation
to the work to be done,20 (2) that a suspended scaffold which is
above a statutory limit in feet from the ground must have a
guard rail or other protective device upon it,2 1 (3) that flooring
on the upper levels of a building under construction should be
laid to within not less than two or three tiers below the level
of the iron construction, 22 (4) that temporary planking must be
Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. § 23-803(s) (1956) [scaffold considered under
hazardous work of the Employer's Liability Law]; California: CAL. LABOR
CODE § 7108 (West 1955); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-46
(1958); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 77 (1953); Illinois: ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1957); Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-301, 20-307
(1954 Replacement); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-109, 44-110 (1964);
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 338.160, 338.170, 338.990(5) (1963);
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1672, 1683 (1965); Maryland: MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48, §§ 111, 115 (1967); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §
182.12 (1947); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 292.090 (1965); Montana: MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 69-1401, 69-1405 (1947); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§
48-425, 48-434 (1963); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5-165 (repealed)
(1962); New York: N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 240, 242 (McKinney, 1965); Okla-
homa: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 174, 177 (1951); Oregon: ORE. REV.
STAT. § 654:310 (1965); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4201, 4204
(1957); Texas: TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1582 (1953).
17. Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 164, 106 N.E. 236, 239
(1914).
18. Id. "The doctrines of assumed risk and of contrubtory negligence
have no application to the statute in question, and furnish no defense there-
under." 264 Ill. at 493.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1957). See note 1 supra.
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 7701 (1953):
A person employing or directing another to perform labor of any
kind in the erection . . . of a house, building or other structure
shall not furnish or erect . . . scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders or
other mechanical contrivances which are unsafe, unsuitable, or im-
proper, and which are not so constructed, placed and operated as to
give proper protection to the life and limb of a person so employed
or engaged.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4202 (1957):
If any scaffolding or staging, swung or suspended from an over-
head support or supports, shall be more than ten feet from the
ground or floor, the same shall be deemed unsuitable and im-
proper ... unless such scaffolding or staging shall, when the same
is in use, have a safety-rail, rising at least thirty-four inches above
the floor or main portion of such scaffolding or staging, and ex-
tending along the outside thereof the entire length of the outside
thereof. ...
22. CAL. LABOR CODE § 7107 (1955): "The erection gang on a building
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
laid on the tier of the iron work whenever it would not interfere
with construction of the building itself,23 (5) that provisions must
be made for both inspection of the work by a predetermined
official, and correction of any unsafe scaffolding,2 4 and (6) that
penalties will be imposed for a violation of the act.
25
Few jurisdictions have decided the question of whether a
permanent beam is to be considered a scaffold under a scaffold
act.26 However, it appears that the courts do not apply a scaffold
act to a case in which an employee falls from a permanent portion
of a structure and is injured.
27
The existing statutory decisions have retained the common-
law distinction between those places specifically supplied for use
by employees for their labor, and those places whereon an em-
ployee must necessarily work during the constuction of a building.
shall at all times have a planked floor below them not more than two
stories distant."
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 65 (1957):
... If the floor beams are of iron or steel the contractors for the
iron or steel work of buildings ... shall thoroughly plank over the
entire tier of iron or steel beams on which the structural iron or
steel work is being erected, except such spaces as may be reason-
ably required for the proper construction of such iron or steel
work and for the raising and lowering of materials, to be used in
the construction of such buildings, or such spaces as may be des-
ignated by the plans and specifications for stairways and elevator
shafts.
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, § 111 (1965):
Whenever complaint is made to the commissioner of police or to
the inspector, or other persons in charge of the police force of any
city . . . that the scaffolding used in the construction, altering, re-
pairing or painting of any building within the limits of such city
. ..is unsafe and dangerous to the life and limb of any person, it
shall be the duty of such police commissioner . .. to immediately
detail a competent police officer to inspect such scaffolding forth-
with, with instructions to prohibit the further use of such scaf-
folding, and, if after proper examination he find the complaint
well founded, to require that it be altered or reconstructed in
such a manner as to render it no longer dangerous to life or
limb ...
25. MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 69-1405 (1947): "Any person violating
any of the provisions of the foregoing sections shall be fined not less than
one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars for each of-
fense. .. ."
26. 35 AM. JuR. Master and Servant § 195 (1967 Supp.).
27. See Legowski v. Moreland, 195 Ill. App. 277 (1915) (workman fell
from uncovered joists of building; court held that instruction ignoring
scaffold act was not error [HuRD's REV. ST. ch. 48, J.&A. para. 5368] since
none of the appliances mentioned in the statute were involved in the in-
jury); Brady v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 134 App. Div. 372, 119 N.Y.S. 75
(1909) (plaintiff fell from deck of a bridge under construction; the court
held that a "platform of a bridge in process of construction" was not within
the meaning of the New York scaffold act [N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 240, 242
(McKinney, 1965) ].
A scaffold act is not applied unless the primary purpose of the
place from which a workman fell was that of a scaffold.28 In
Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co.,29 for example, a workman fell
from the completed portions of a metal roof which he was in-
stalling. Plaintiff contended that the permanently installed por-
tions of the roof should be considered a scaffold under the Illinois
Structural Work Act. 0 The workman had to walk upon this
roof while carrying roofing materials to the place where they were
being attached to the framework, and he slipped and fell from
the roof, sustaining injuries. The Parizon court in refusing to
apply the act to the permanently installed roof stated:
It is difficult to conclude that the intent or understanding
of the legislature was that the language of the Act applied
to a fixed permanent structure, or that such a structure,
or its parts, would be a scaffold or platform within the
meaning of the Act."1
There is authority to the contrary holding that if a per-
manent part of a building is being used temporarily by workmen
as a support, it will fall under the coverage of a scaffold act.
2
However, this authority is distinguishable on its facts. In Carpen-
ter v. Burmeister33 a workman fell from planks which were slated
to be nailed onto the roof and become a permanent part of the
building. However, at the time of his fall the boards were not
yet nailed to the roof and were not yet a permanent part of
the structure. Until the boards were affixed they were no more
than planks upon which the workmen were to walk, and their
primary purpose was as a scaffold. The case, therefore, does not
28. For common law discussion see note 14 supra, and accompanying
text. The distinction remains under statutory discussions. See Welk v.
Jackson Architectural Iron Works, 98 App. Div. 247, 90 N.Y.S. 541 (1904),
where a workman fell from a temporary wooden beam which was to sup-
port iron beams until they were placed, and was not intended to be used as
a scaffold for workmen. The dissenting opinion reads in part:
This temporary wooden beam, conceding it to have been intended
incidentally for the workmen to walk over in placing the iron
beams, was no more of a scaffold than the iron beams which were
to be laid upon it, and which the workmen would have to walk
over more or less in the performance of the details of the labor;
and it seems to be entirely clear that this beam was not designed
as a platform to walk upon, but as a mere temporary support for
the iron beams, with the same incidental purpose of use in walking
over as any of the other timbers used in the construction of the
building. The mere calling of a beam a scaffold does not make it
so unless the object for which it was primarily designed was that
of a scaffold....
(dissenting opinion accepted on appeal, 184 N.Y. 519, 26 N.E. 1116 (1906))
(emphasis added).
29. 71 Ill. App. 2d 53, 218 N.E.2d 27 (1966).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1957).
31. Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 71 Ill. App. 2d 53, 218 N.E.2d
27, 34 (1966).
32. Carpenter v. Burmeister, 217 Mo. 104, 273 S.W. 418 (1925) (work-
man fell from boards on roof); Ross v. Delaware, L.&W. R. Co., 231 N.Y.
335, 132 N.E. 108 (1921) (workman fell from boards on a tressel).
33. 216 Mo. 104, 273 S.W. 418 (1925).
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state that if a permanent part of a building is used as a support,
it should be considered a scaffold. It is submitted that after being
nailed to the roof the primary purpose of the boards would be as
a fixed structure, with the incident use of a walkway for em-
ployees, and hence would not be considered scaffolding. Spiezio
v. Commonwealth Edison 4 definitely includes a permanent part
of the building under construction within the scaffolding act. In
Spiezio the workman fell from a vertical steel column upon which
it was necessary for him to climb. The column itself was too
wide for him to hold onto, and he had climbed it by using hand
and toe holds molded into the steel itself. The court held that
under the Illinois Scaffold Act, the permanent nature of a work-
man's support does not necessarily take the case outside of the
Act. Saying that not every place a workman stands should be
considered a scaffold, the court held that if a permanent part of
a building is intended to be used, and is used temporarily, as a
support for a workman, it should be considered a scaffold. Con-
ceding that the column had toe holds specifically designed to be
worked from, thus differing from a flat beam or joist, the court
in Spiezio still seemed to overlook the precedent of considering
the primary purpose of a permanent structure, and concentrated
instead on the incidental purpose of support for workmen.
It thus appears that as a general rule a permanent part of
a building under construction is not considered a scaffold within
the meaning of the Scaffold Act. Although in some fact situations
there is a departure from this general rule, a study of the Louis
case will show that the court should have followed the general
rule instead of trying to broaden the application of the Illinois
Scaffold Act.
Louis v. BARENFANGER
In the Louis case the court considered two issues: (1) whether
a steel beam is excluded from a scaffold act because of its per-
manent nature, and (2) whether an employer can be held liable
for failing to supply a scaffold. Addressing itself to the issue of
whether a permanent part of a building is excluded from the
Scaffold Act, the Louis court noted that the Illinois Scaffold Act 8
nowhere excluded a permanent portion of the building from its
coverage.86 Furthermore, said the court, the legislature had not
defined what shall be considered a safe scaffold because what
34. 91 Il. App. 2d 392, 235 N.E.2d 323 (1968).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1957).
36. Louis v. Barenfanger, 39 Ill. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1968).
could be considered adequate and safe in one circumstance may
be totally unsuited in anotherY The court then held that a per-
manent beam is within the Scaffold Act, but by so holding its
decision, as has been shown, is contra to existing authority.
8
In support of its conclusion the court cited examples of cases in
which a permanent structure was considered a scaffold. 9 How-
ever, none of the cited cases support the court's holding on this
question.
40
It appears that by holding a permanent beam of a building to
be a scaffold or support under the Scaffold Act, the Louis court
expanded the coverage of the Act beyond the reasonable bounds
of statutory interpretation. By including the beam under the
Act, the court not only usurped the function of the Illinois legis-
lature4' through judicial expansion of the Act, but also ignored
existing contrary authority, while misconstruing the distinctions
already inherent in a scaffold act.
Absent an explicit statement of reasoning in the majority
opinion, one may assume that the inclusion of a permanent beam
within the coverage of the Act was based upon the court's inter-
37. Id. at 726, quoting Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156,
164, 106 N.E. 236, 239 (1914).
38. Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 72 Ill. App. 2d 397,
219 N.E.2d 627 (1966) (workman fell from struts and wire mesh while
installing a false ceiling; court held that the scaffold act did not apply
since the wire mesh was a part of the work, and the struts were permanent
parts of the building); Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 71 Ill. App. 2d 53,
218 N.E.2d 27 (1966) (See note 29 supra and accompanying text).
39. Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960);
Skinner v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Ill. 1962); Frick v. O'Hare-
Chicago Corp., 70 Ill. App. 2d 313, 217 N.E.2d 552 (1966); Oldham v. Kubin-
ski, 37 Ill. App. 2d 65, 185 N.E.2d 270 (1962).
40. The authority cited by the court does not support its decision for
in none of the cited cases did the workman fall from a permanent structure;
Bounougios v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960) (fell from
overhead crane which had been specifically placed so that he could
stand on it while painting); Skinner v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 424
(E.D. Ill. 1962) (workman fell from ladder improperly placed against a
hanger door; "ladder" is specifically enumerated as an instrument that
must be properly placed within the Illinois scaffold act); Frick v. O'Hare-
Chicago Corp., 70 Ill. App. 2d 303, 217 N.E.2d 552 (1966) (workman fell from
plank across a concrete form, not from a permanent structure); Oldham v.
Kubinski, 37 Ill. App. 2d 65, 185 N.E.2d 270 (1962) (workman fell twelve feet
from a shovel extension mounted on a tractor; "hoist" is specifically listed
in the statute). Also in support of its holding, the Louis majority quoted
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Koepp v. National Enameling and Stamp-
ing Co., 151 Wis. 302, 139 N.W. 179 (1912), as stating that the Wisconsin
legislature left "little, if anything, uncovered which may be used" to support
workmen under the scaffold act. However, the Wisconsin court prefaced its
statement with and addressed its statement towards any "temporary struc-
ture made up of parts . . . used for support while doing any kind of work
mentioned in the law. . . ." A temporary scaffold existed in the Koepp case.
Finally, Louis cited to 35 AM. JUR. Master and Servant § 195 (1967 Supp.)
for support. But the cases discussed there did not involve permanent parts
of a building. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.




pretation of legislative intention at the time the Act was passed.
An examination shows that the suspension of the safe-place rule
in a construction situation, absent a statutory duty, had led to
many abuses on the employer's part in relation to the safety of
his men employed on the construction site. It is these abuses
which were eradicated when the legislature created mandatory
standards of safety that applied both to scaffolds and to the
building under construction itself.
It is submitted that there is inherent in a scaffold act a
legislative realization that construction workers, by necessity, at
some moment in their work are working upon the steel beams.
The safety standards of a scaffold act are not intended to be
applied to such a situation.42 As an example of an implied limita-
tion to the application of a scaffold act, consider the interrelation
of the sections of the Illinois Scaffold Act. Section 60 of the
Act 45 states that all scaffolding must be safe. Section 6344 states
that if upon inspection a scaffold is found to be unsafe, notification
must be given to the employer. He in turn must prohibit the
use of the scaffold, remove it from the working area, and alter
or reconstruct it until it is made safe for the use of his workmen.
This procedure of removal and reconstruction is clearly incapable
of being applied to a permanently installed beam. By implication
the Act refers only to those contrivances specifically constructed
as a place from which workmen are employed, contrivances that
can be removed and reconstructed if necessary. It is contended
that under a scaffold act the common law distinction is retained
between those places specifically erected for support, and those
places primarily designed as a permanent installation, albeit with
an incidental use as a support.
The Louis court disregards this, and reaches a decision which,
if carried to its logical conclusion, will make an employer liable
to his employee under the Scaffold Act if the latter falls from
42. See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
43. See note 1 supra.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 63 (1957):
If, after examination, such scaffolding, platform or device or any
of such parts is found to be dangerous to the life or limb of any
person, the Director of Labor or such local authority shall at once
notify the person responsible for its erection or maintenance of
such fact, and warn him against the use, maintenance or operation
thereof, and prohibit the use thereof, and require the same to be
altered and reconstructed so as to avoid such danger. . . . After
such notice has been so served or affixed, the person responsible
therefor shall cease using and immediately remove such scaffold-
ing, platform or other device, or parts thereof, and alter or strength-
en it in such manner as to render it safe.
any steel beam upon which he is working, no matter where that
beam may be or what the worker's job. It is submitted that
this decision ignores the realities of construction. The policy of
balancing an employer's duty with an employee's assumption of
risk of injury on those portions of a building under construction
not included within a scaffold act, has seemingly been discarded.
The second holding of the Louis court was that a failure to
provide scaffolding could be the basis for a cause of action under
the Illinois Act.45 As noted earlier,4 at common-law an employer
did not have to erect scaffolding on high construction beams for
his employee's safety. The Louis court examined the general
background of statutory purpose and legislative intent surround-
ing the creation of the Scaffold Act.47 It found that this situation
has been changed. The court reinterpreted and expanded the Act
by this holding, for it reached its conclusion in the face of con-
trary Illinois decisions.
48
The objective of the Illinois Act as construed by the court
was "to provide protection to workmen engaged in extrahazardous
work,"49 and the statutory purpose "was 'to prevent injuries to
persons employed in this dangerous and extrahazardous occupa-
tion, so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing
their work might not prove fatal.' ,,0 The court explained that
"the words of a statute should be construed to give effect to the
legislative intention, which must be ascertained not only from the
language of the entire act, but from the evil to be remedied and
the object to be attained."
51
In light of this legislative background, the court found that
a failure to supply a scaffold was a basis for a cause of action
under the Act. It apparently reasoned that since the legislature
45. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (1957).
46. See notes 10, 11 supra and accompanying text.
47. This background is based upon references to three cases: Larson v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 I1. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965) (workman
fell from scaffolding); Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry.
Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961) (same); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson
Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914) (workman fell from scaffold runway).
It will be noted that a scaffold was in existence in all of these cases, and
that the question of an employer's duty to erect a scaffold was not at any
time in issue.
48. Morck v. Nicosia, 91 Ill. App. 2d 327, 235 N.E.2d 287 (1968) (work-
man fell from beams); Parizon v. Granite City Steel Co., 71 Ill. App. 2d 53,
218 N.E.2d 27 (1966) (fell from roof); Bradley v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District, 56 Ill. App. 2d 482, 206 N.W.2d 276 (1965) (workman injured in
excavation cave-in).
49. 236 N.E.2d at 726, citing: Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 hi. 156,
106 N.E. 236 (1914); Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry.
Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961); Larson v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
50. 236 N.E.2d at 726, quoting Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill.
156, 164, 106 N.E. 236, 239 (1914).
51. 236 N.E.2d at 726, quoting Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific Ry. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 317, 175 N.E.2d 785, 791 (1961).
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
intended to provide protection to structural workers by passing
an act relative to scaffolding used in structural work, it must
have been the legislative intention to make actionable a failure
to provide a scaffold if a workman falls from any steel beam.
The court stated that from "a realistic viewpoint, if the failure
to provide scaffolding Would not be actionable under this statute,
then every person to whom the Act was directed could defeat its
purpose by simply failing to provide a scaffold .... ,,12 Further-
more, said the court, holding that a failure to erect scaffolding
would not be actionable would produce the "'absurd result . ..
that a statute designed to broaden the common-law duty and to
give added protection, would be construed as imposing a lesser
duty than the common law.' "03
The Louis court disregarded the fact that prior cases realized
and maintained the balance of duties existent in a scaffold act.
It is true that an employer must erect scaffolding in certain
areas of the work, for example, temporary flooring must be laid
to within a certain statutory level below the iron construction.
5 4
52. 236 N.E.2d at 726.
53. Id., quoting Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 IM. 2d 316,
325, 211 N.E.2d 247, 253 (1965):
Even at common law retention of the right to control the work is
sufficient to subject one to duty and tort responsibility, . . and
the retention of the right to control must carry with it the same
duty and responsibility under the Scaffold Act. Otherwise, the
absurd result would be that a statute designed to broaden the
common-law duty and to give added protection, would be con-
strued as imposing a lesser duty than the common law.
(It will be noted that the Larson court is deciding where the liability for an
unsafe scaffold shall rest, and the question of an employer's failure to erect
a scaffold was not in issue. There was a scaffold existant from which the
workman fell in the facts of the Larson case). The Louis court cites to 20
A.L.R.2d 873 (1950) to support its decision that an employer must place
scaffolding on the building, noting that a failure to erect scaffolding would
breach an employer's duty to provide a safe place to work at common law.
But the A.L.R. does not support the court, for as noted earlier (note 12
supra) the safe-place rule was subject to an exception in a construction
situation. In addition, section 5 of the cited A.L.R. does not state that an
employer must place scaffolding on beams, but reads instead:
A general contractor in possession and control of a building is
under a duty toward employees of other contractors on the job to
see that joists and other supports for floors, roofs, and places
temporarily to be used to stand walk or sit on, are reasonably
safe to work on.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 65 (1957):
All contractors and owners . . . where the plans and specifications
require the floors to be arched between the beams thereof . . .
shall complete the flooring or filling in as the building progresses,
to not less than within three tiers or beams below that on which
the iron work is being erected. If the plans and specifications . ..
do not require filling in between the beams or floors, . . . all
contractors for carpenter work in the course of construction shall
However, excluding those specific places at which scaffolding must
be laid, most scaffold acts, and the Illinois Act, allow broad discre-
tion to an employer to determine when to use a scaffold. Section
60 of the Illinois Scaffold Act,5 5 for example, states that when a
scaffold is "erected and constructed" it must then be safe. Section
65 of the Act50 states that on the level of the ironwork itself,
scaffolding must be placed only where it will not interfere with
the construction work in progress, or the necessary supplying of
such work. Thus it would seem that the legislature has stated
that scaffolding need not be placed on certain portions of the
work. It is in the employer's discretion to decide what space is
reasonably needed for the construction itself, and this in turn
will determine the extent of such scaffolding. A further example
of the employer's discretion is section 64 of the Act, 57 relating to
work on high smokestacks and the like. This section does not
state when an employer must use a scaffold, but it states instead
that if a scaffold is used the employer is required to have an
operative subscaffolding existant.
In Louis the plaintiff did not fall from erected scaffolding,
but from a steel beam. The court, by holding that the employee
has a cause of action because the employer failed to place scaf-
folding on this beam, eradicated the discretion vested in the em-
ployer by a scaffold act. It appears that the Louis court would
require an employer to place scaffolding on each and every beam
positioned on the structure. This scaffolding would have to be
placed, removed and placed again as the construction progressed
beam by beam. By holding that a failure to provide a scaffold
can be actionable in this situation, the court not only ignored
existant cases, but it did not reasonably interpret the Scaffold
Act. The court's analysis of the background and purpose of a
scaffold act is correct, but it failed to take notice that the legis-
lature, while protecting construction workers, also realized the
necessities of modern construction, and left broad discretion in
the experienced employer as to when a scaffold must be erected.
lay the under flooring thereof or a safe temporary floor on each
story as the building progresses to not less than within two stories
or floors below the one to which such building has been erected.
55. See note 1 supra.
56. See note 23 supra.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 64 (1957):
That any person, firm or corporation in this State, hiring, em-
ploying, or directing another to perform labor of any kind, in the
erecting, repairing, altering or painting of any water pipe, stand
pipe, tank, smoke stack, chimney, tower, steeple, pole, staff, dome
or cupola when the use of any scaffold, staging, swing, hammock,
support, temporary platform or other similar contrivance are re-
quired or used, in the performance of such labor, shall keep and
maintain at all times, while such labor is being performed, and
such mechanical device is in use or operation, a safe and proper
scaffold, stay, support or other suitable device, not less than six-




Absent a statute, the common-law rule of providing a safe
place to work is not applied to a construction situation, and an
employee on the beams of a building, barring the negligence of an
employer or a latent defect, assumes the risk of an injury. The
scaffold acts, applied to construction, eliminate many of the dan-
gers inherent in such work by creating mandatory standards of
safety to which an employer must adhere. However, even under
these acts, an employer is given broad discretion in deciding when
the necessities of his work require the use of a scaffold. Once
this discretion is exercised and a scaffold is used, a scaffold act
requires the employer to meet statutory standards. Inherent in
a scaffold act is the realization that construction workers, by
the very nature of their work, must sometimes walk and work
upon the beams of a building. It is contended that the Act is not
applicable to those beams, and that the employee is then assuming
the risk of an injury.
Louis not only eradicated the employer's discretion, but also
expanded the Scaffold Act to include those very beams to which
the act was not intended to apply. The decision, if followed, could
become a costly and time-consuming hinderance to the construc-
tion process, for it would require an employer to apply scaffolding
standards to every beam positioned on the structure. It is sub-
mitted that this expansion of the Act to include the permanent
beams, should be reconsidered in the light of both the realities
of construction and the legislative intent already expressed in
the Act.
JAY W. LEWIS
